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Conscious processing is generally seen as required for flexible and willful actions, as well
as for tasks that require durable information maintenance. Here we present research that
questions the assumption that only consciously perceived information is durable (>500
ms). Using the attentional blink (AB) phenomenon, we rendered otherwise relatively clearly
perceived letters non-conscious. In a first experiment we systematically manipulated the
delay between stimulus presentation and response, for the purpose of estimating the
durability of non-conscious perceptual representations. For items reported not seen, we
found that behavioral performance was better than chance across intervals up to 15 s.
In a second experiment we used fMRI to investigate the neural correlates underlying
the maintenance of non-conscious perceptual representations. Critically, the relatively
long delay period demonstrated in experiment 1 enabled isolation of the signal change
specifically related to the maintenance period, separate from stimulus presentation and
response. We found sustained BOLD signal change in the right mid-lateral prefrontal
cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, and crus II of the cerebellum during maintenance of non-
consciously perceived information. These findings are consistent with the controversial
claim that working-memory mechanisms are involved in the short-term maintenance of
non-conscious perceptual representations.
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INTRODUCTION
The functional complexity of the human brain enables us to
perceive and interact with our environment in a flexible and
deliberate manner. However, despite our intuition to the contrary,
we only consciously experience a fraction of the accompanying
processes. We thus have the capacity to perceive more informa-
tion than we can consciously experience, with the consequence
that some perceived information about the external environment
remains non-conscious, as demonstrated by phenomena like
masking (Dehaene et al., 2001) and the attentional blink (AB;
Luck et al., 1996).
Higher-level cognitive functions, associated with frontal and
parietal cortical regions, have traditionally been considered the
exclusive product of conscious processes, while non-conscious
processes have been considered limited to automatic, lower-
level functions (Koch and Crick, 2001). Correspondingly, neu-
roimaging studies investigating the neural correlates of conscious
experiences have often found that activity in the prefrontal and
parietal network (PPN) correlates with conscious perception
(Rees et al., 2002; Naghavi and Nyberg, 2005). Based on the
frequent involvement of the PPN in conscious perception, the
Global Neuronal Workspace (GNW) model states that widespread
and recurrent prefrontal and parietal activity determines if infor-
mation is consciously experienced or not. According to the model,
long-distance axons of the PPN, together with thalamocortical
loops, form a “global workspace” that interconnects many spe-
cialized, automatic, and (otherwise) non-conscious processors.
Non-conscious information is hypothesized to become con-
scious once it is globally broadcast via the PPN and thereby
available to many brain regions, enabling depth of process-
ing, more flexible use of information, and durable (>500 ms)
representations in working memory and long-term memory
(Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Dehaene et al., 2014).The effects
of non-conscious perception have been investigated and hotly
debated during the past century (see Kouider and Dehaene,
2007, for review). Recent discoveries suggest that several func-
tions previously associated uniquely with conscious processing
can take place after non-conscious perception, and in some
cases, activate parts of the PPN, e.g., cognitive control (Lau
and Passingham, 2007), flexibility and context-specificity (Wokke
et al., 2011), monetary motivation (Pessiglione et al., 2007),
and error detection (Logan and Crump, 2010). Most recently,
durable (up to 5 s) non-conscious perceptual representations
have been demonstrated (Soto et al., 2011), challenging the com-
mon notion that non-conscious representations are extremely
short-lived.
To investigate the durability of non-conscious representations
we here used the AB paradigm as a way to manipulate the
conscious experience of seeing a particular stimulus. As the AB
effect is not consistent across trials (for a given set of parameters,
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participants will see a target stimulus on some trials and not
see it on others), the AB phenomenon is a useful tool for creat-
ing conditions with identical experimental parameters, but with
differing conscious experiences. Furthermore, the AB is known
to enable relatively long non-conscious presentation durations,
e.g., 100 ms (Martens and Wyble, 2010), compared with up to
50 ms for masking (Greenwald et al., 1996). The AB paradigm
therefore has the potential to elicit relatively strong non-conscious
brain activity (Sergent et al., 2005), and possibly more durable
representations.
In a first behavioral experiment we manipulated the delay
durations between unseen stimuli presentations and responses to
estimate the longevity of non-conscious representations, estab-
lishing that non-conscious representations can last for up to 15 s.
In a second experiment we used fMRI with a similar paradigm
to investigate the neural correlates underlying the maintenance
of non-conscious representations. Critically, the relatively long
interval between stimulus and response enabled a within-trial
separation of BOLD signal related to different trial components
(stimulus presentation, delay period, and response), similar to
the approach used in neuroimaging research on working memory
(Curtis and D’Esposito, 2003).
According to the GNW model there should be no working-
memory involvement during processing of non-conscious repre-
sentations. Contrary to this prediction however, recent research
has suggested that working memory operations could account
for the durable retention of non-conscious representations (Soto
et al., 2011; Pan et al., 2013; Soto and Silvanto, 2014). Fur-
thermore, Dutta et al. (2014) have demonstrated BOLD signal
increase in PPN during a delayed cue-target orientation discrimi-
nation task with non-conscious sample presentations. However,
given the sluggishness of the BOLD signal and that the delay
period used by Dutta et al. was short (1.5 s), it is unclear if the
signal change was related to maintenance or to stimulus and/or
response processing. If working-memory mechanisms indeed are
responsible for the maintenance of non-conscious representations
there should be sustained BOLD signal change in brain regions
characteristically involved in working memory during the delay
period, specifically, frontal and parietal cortex related to executive
processes and temporal integration of previously attained per-
ceptual knowledge and its prospective use (Cabeza and Nyberg,




For experiment 1 (behavioral experiment) 24 participants were
recruited from the Umeå University campus area. All partici-
pants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, gave written
informed consent, and were paid for participation. Participants
were excluded if they failed to comply with instructions (two
participants for systematically pressing the same response instead
of guessing), or if they had significantly different reported per-
ceptual awareness ratings of target stimulus as a function of time
(one participant). Twenty one participants (18–39 year age range,
M = 24 years, 13 female) were thus included in the statistical
analyses.
For experiment 2 (fMRI experiment) 27 participants were
recruited from the Umeå University campus area. All partic-
ipants were right handed and had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, gave written informed consent, and were paid
for participation. The experiment was approved by the ethics
committee at the University Hospital of Northern Sweden. Par-
ticipants were excluded if they failed to comply with instructions
(one participant for systematically pressing the same response
instead of guessing), or if they had significantly different reported
perceptual awareness ratings as a function of time (no partici-
pant excluded). Twenty six participants (21–29 year age range,
M = 24 years, 15 female) were thus included in the statistical
analyses.
STIMULI AND PROCEDURE
In experiment 1, two targets were presented in a rapid serial
visual presentation (RSVP) sequence consisting of three-digit
distractors (Figure 1A). The first target (T1) was an addition
task displayed in red, which the participants were instructed
to solve immediately and to retain the answer until prompted
to respond. The second target (T2) was a letter (A, S, D, or
F) flanked by two randomly assigned digits. By presenting T1
and T2 in a specific time sequence, visibility of T2 is severely
reduced. This phenomenon is usually explained as an effect of
attentional processing of T1 that hinders processing of T2, either
by depleting resources or through attentional control mecha-
nisms (Raymond et al., 1992; Martens and Wyble, 2010). A
key goal of the present experimental paradigm was to allow
for a relatively long T2 stimulus duration (e.g., 133 ms) by
generating a strong AB effect. To this end T1 consisted of an
attentionally demanding, but mathematically simple addition
task, under the assumption that a more demanding T1 enhances
the AB effect (Martens and Wyble, 2010). Stimulus duration
was initially set to 133 ms and then adjusted online (shifted
up or down between blocks in steps of one display refresh rate
(60 Hz); each of six blocks consisted of 42–60 trials, depending
on T1 performance (incorrect T1 response automatically added
a trial until a correct T1 response or the upper trial limit was
reached), totaling in 252–360 trials) to ensure an approximate
50/50 distribution between seen/unseen trials despite individual
differences.
A critical parameter for the AB is the lag between T1 and
T2, such that if the lag is too short or too long, the effect
is attenuated or canceled. We were here mainly interested in
parameters that cause the AB to occur in approximately 50% of
the trials to allow a comparison of conscious vs. non-conscious
processing. However, to verify the phenomenon as such with
the current experimental protocol, we used both short (strong
AB effect) and long (weak AB effect) lags between T1 and T2.
Each short-lag RSVP started with a central crosshair for 3000 ms
after which 4–9 distractors were presented, followed by T1, one
intervening distractor, and T2. Distractors were then displayed
until 5, 10, or 15 s had passed from T2 presentation. The long-
lag RSVPs (n = 36) were randomly interspersed with short-lag
trials (n = 180), differing in the number of distractors between
T1 and T2, and in delay time (always 10 s; Figure 1B). During
trials with the longest T1-T2 lag, T2 was presented at the end
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FIGURE 1 | Illustration depicting the procedure for experiment 1 and 2. A
mathtask (T1) and a letter (T2) flanked by distracters were presented in a
rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP). The solution to T1, and T2 identity,
were held in memory during a variable delay until probed for responses.
(A) Short- and (B) long-lag trials in experiment 1 and the pre-fMRI session. In
(B) the variable delays before and after T2 presentation were adjusted such
that T2 appeared early, in the middle, or at the end of the RSVP. (C) Illustration
of a short-lag trial in the fMRI session.
of the RSVP. Thus, the participants had to attend the entire
RSVP, during which they did not know whether they missed a
short-lag T2 or if a long-lag T2 was to be presented at the very
end.
After each RSVP participants answered three queries: (i) a
four-alternative forced-choice (4AFC) task regarding T2 identity;
(ii) to what degree they had a subjective experience of seeing
T2; (iii) the answer to T1. The conscious experience of seeing
T2 or not was judged on a four-point perceptual awareness
scale (PAS; Overgaard et al., 2006; Sandberg et al., 2010). The
PAS scale descriptions used were: (1) no visual experience of
T2; (2) vague visual experience of T2; (3) almost clear visual
experience of T2; and (4) clear visual experience of T2. All
ratings above 1 were treated as indicating conscious percep-
tion. When T2 was unseen the participants had been instructed
to guess when prompted regarding T2 identity by responding
with the first letter that came to mind. To create a reference
condition for the subjective experience of not seeing T2, there
were also 36 trials without a T2 (replaced by a distractor).
Therefore, trials with and without T2 that were given PAS
ratings of 1 shared the same (lack of) subjective experience
of T2.
Experiment 2 consisted of a pre-fMRI session (four blocks
totaling 124–144 trials depending on T1 performance and/or if
the upper trial limit was reached; 84 short-lag, 20 long-lag, and
20 T2-absent trials) and an fMRI session (two runs, each run
consisted of two blocks totaling 116 trials; 80 short-lag and 36
T2-absent trials), and used a similar procedure as for experi-
ment 1 with the following changes. The pre-fMRI session was
modified by using three instead of four steps in the PAS scale,
because combining “clear or almost clear experience” (steps 3
and 4) was easier and more intuitive to use for the participants,
without losing the important distinction between “no experi-
ence” and “vague experience”. The pre-fMRI session enabled
us to screen for unsuitable participants, e.g., “non-blinkers”
(Martens and Wyble, 2010), and to adjust the individual stimu-
lus durations for approximate 50/50 distribution of seen/unseen
trials before the fMRI session, although stimulus durations were
also adjusted during the fMRI session. The fMRI session had
some additional changes (Figure 1C): (i) added jitter to the
inter-trial interval (3–7 s), delay-period (5–15 s in steps of 1 s
instead of 5 s), and the inter-stimulus interval (3–7 s) between
the 4AFC and PAS response, to reduce correlations between com-
ponents of the statistical model; (ii) the delay period consisted
of passively viewing a dot, but four distractors remained after T2
presentation to uphold the AB effect and overwrite any iconic
memory representations; and (iii) response-time limits of 4 s for
all responses.
fMRI ACQUISITION
The fMRI session in experiment 2 was conducted at 3T with a
GE 3 Tesla Discovery MR750 scanner with a 32-channel receive-
only head coil. Each subject underwent one session with two
functional runs (784 volumes each) of scanning using a T2∗-
weighted gradient echo pulse sequence, echo planar imaging, field
of view = 25 cm, matrix size = 96 × 96, slice thickness = 2.9
mm, 37 slices with no inter-slice skip and an ASSET acceleration
factor of 2. The volumes covered the whole cerebrum and most
of the cerebellum, the acquisition orientation was oblique axial
and aligned with the anterior and posterior commissure, and
was scanned in interleaved order with TE = 30 ms, TR = 2 s,
flip angle = 90◦. Between the two functional runs a high-
resolution T1-weighted structural image was collected FSPGR
with TE = 3.2 ms, TR = 8.2 ms, TI = 450 ms, and flip angle
= 12◦.
DATA PROCESSING AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
For the behavioral results of both experiments, only trials where
T1 was answered correctly were used in the analyses, because if
T1 was not processed there would likely not be an AB during T2.
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For response times a two SD cut-off was used for each condition
(PAS > 1 and PAS = 1) and participant separately.
The software used for processing and analysis of fMRI data
was SPM8 (Welcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Lon-
don, UK), run in Matlab 7.11 (Mathworks, Inc., Sherborn,
MA, USA). Before preprocessing a manual quality control was
conducted using in-house software. Preprocessing was done in
the following order: slice-timing correction to the first slice
using Fourier phase-shift interpolation method, head-motion
correction with unwarping of B0 distortions, DARTEL normal-
ization (Ashburner, 2007) using a 12-parameter affine transfor-
mation model to MNI anatomical space, and an 8 mm FWHM
Gaussian smoothing. DARTEL normalization and smoothing
was applied on the contrast images after intrasubject model
estimation.
For intrasubject modeling a General Linear Model (GLM)
with restricted maximum likelihood estimation was used. The
model consisted of the following regressors of interest: trial
epochs (stimulus presentation, delay, and response)-by-trial type
(short-lag or T2 absent)-by-T1 accuracy (correct or incorrect)-
by-PAS rating (1, 2, or 3), and inter-trial interval. Missed 4AFC
responses (because of time limit), head motion (six parameters)
and physiological noise (six parameters) estimated with tComp-
Cor (temporal variation in white matter and cerebral spinal fluid;
Behzadi et al., 2007), were included as nuisance regressors. All
regressors except for head motion and physiological noise were
convolved with the “canonical” hemodynamic response function.
The high-pass filter had a cut-off at 128 s, and the autocorrelation
model was global AR (1).
For each individual and each trial epoch (stimulus
presentation, delay, and response), the following conditions
were compared: T2-seen > T2-absent and T2-unseen > T2-
absent. Average signal change across conditions during each of
the three trial epochs relative to a low-level baseline (ITI) was
defined as (T2-seen + T2-unseen + T2-absent)/3 > ITI. Model
estimations from each individual were taken into second-level
random-effects analyses (one-sample t-tests) to account for
inter-individual variability. The statistical inferences were made
on the whole brain with p ≤ 0.001 uncorrected for multiple
comparisons, cluster extent ≥20.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
The average T1 performance was 82% for experiment 1, 86% for
the pre-fMRI session, and 80% for the fMRI session. The average
proportion of unseen T2s (PAS = 1 given correct T1) when T2
was present were 45% for experiment 1, 37% for the pre-fMRI
session, and 32% for the fMRI session. The average proportion
of false alarms were 12% for experiment 1, 12% for the pre-fMRI
session, and 25% for the fMRI session.
There was a significant difference in T2 performance between
short- and long-lag trials, (experiment 1: F(1,20) = 74.70,
p < 0.001; experiment 2: F(1,25) = 30.94, p < 0.001), thereby
replicating previous research on the AB in that the T1-T2 time
interval had a high impact on T2 performance.
In experiment 1, there was a main effect of T2 visibility
(T2-seen and T2-unseen trials) on T2 performance, but no
main effect of delay time (Table 1). There was a significant
visibility-by-delay time interaction, such that seen T2 perfor-
mance declined over time, whereas unseen T2 performance did
not. Critically, performance on unseen T2 was significantly better
than chance (0.25) at all three time points (Table 1). A second
analysis only on T2-unseen (PAS = 1) trials revealed no signif-
icant main effect of delay time (Table 1). Response times for
T2-seen trials were significantly shorter than T2-unseen trials
(t(1,20) = −3.18, p = 0.005) and T2-absent trials (t(1,20) = −2.57,
p = 0.02). Response times for T2-unseen trials were not
significantly different from T2-absent trials (t(1,20) = −0.39,
p = 0.70).
All behavioral results in experiment 1 were replicated in exper-
iment 2 for the pre-fMRI and fMRI session with two exceptions:
(i) there was no significant T2 visibility-by-delay time interac-
tion in experiment 2; and (ii) T2-unseen performance was at
chance-level during the third time point in the pre-fMRI session
(Table 1).
In experiment 2, response times for T2-seen trials were signif-
icantly shorter than T2-unseen trials (pre-fMRI: t(1,25) = −3.43,
p = 0.002; fMRI: t(1,25) = −2.64, p = 0.01) and T2-absent trials
(pre-fMRI: t(1,25) = −3.76, p = 0.001; fMRI: t(1,25) = −3.46,
p = 0.002). Response times for T2-unseen trials were not signifi-
cantly different from T2-absent trials (pre-fMRI: t(1,25) = −1.28,
p = 0.21; fMRI: t(1,25) =−1.56, p = 0.13).
fMRI RESULTS
Using the attentional blink to investigate memory
The AB phenomenon has been used extensively in previous
research to investigate attention and also conscious experience.
It is less commonly used to investigate aspects of memory.
Here, we have used the AB to manipulate conscious percep-
tion but have designed the experiment similar to protocols
investigating working memory, with a stimulus presentation,
followed by a short delay, followed by a probe. Similar to
previous neuroimaging research on working memory, we used
multiple regression to identify BOLD signal change specifically
related to different within-trial components (stimulus presen-
tation, delay, and probe). To verify this approach, we first
compared each trial epoch with a low-level baseline (the inter-
trial interval), averaged across the three conditions (the par-
ticipants were required to keep information online during the
delay period even for T2-absent trials, as T1 was present in all
trials).
Comparing stimulus presentation with the low-level baseline
revealed BOLD signal change in widespread frontal, parieto-
temporal, and cerebellum regions bilaterally (Figure 2A). The
delay-period comparison against the low-level baseline revealed
sustained BOLD signal change in the left inferior frontal
gyrus, and bilateral occipital cortex (Figure 2B). Comparing the
response and the low-level baseline revealed bilateral BOLD signal
change in the frontal, parietal, temporal, and occipital cortex, and
cerebellum (Figure 2C).
Comparing T2-present and T2-absent trials
Comparing T2-seen with T2-absent trials during T2 stimulus-
presentation revealed wide-spread BOLD signal change, most
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Table 1 | Behavioral results.
F/t (df) p-value PAS = 1 PAS > 1
M (SE) 95% Cl M (SE) 95% Cl
LL UL LL UL
Experiment 1
T2 visibility 129.98 (1, 20) < 0.001 0.34 (0.02) 0.30 0.38 0.75 (0.04) 0.68 0.83
Delay 1.02 (2, 40) 0.37
T2 visibility*delay 4.15 (2, 40) 0.02
T2 acc. 5 s 0.32 (0.02) 0.28 0.37 0.79 (0.03) 0.73 0.86
T2 acc. 10 s 0.36 (0.03) 0.30 0.41 0.73 (0.05) 0.62 0.84
T2 acc. 15 s 0.33 (0.03) 0.28 0.39 0.74 (0.03) 0.66 0.81
T2 delay (PAS = 1) 1.14 (2, 40) 0.33
T2 response times −3.17 (1, 20) 0.005 1962 (88) 1780 2145 1706 (89) 1521 1890
Experiment 2: Pre-fMRI
T2 visibility 148.25 (1, 25) < 0.001 0.33 (0.02) 0.28 0.39 0.78 (0.03) 0.70 0.85
Delay 2.09 (2, 50) 0.13
T2 visibility*delay 0.14 (2, 50) 0.87
T2 acc. 5 s 0.34 (0.03) 0.28 0.41 0.80 (0.03) 0.74 0.87
T2 acc. 10 s 0.34 (0.04) 0.27 0.42 0.78 (0.04) 0.70 0.86
T2 acc. 15 s 0.31 (0.04) 0.23 0.39 0.74 (0.04) 0.66 0.83
T2 delay (PAS = 1) 0.41 (2, 50) 0.66
T2 response times −3.43 (1, 25) 0.002 1619 (143) 1326 1913 1228 (57) 1112 1345
Experiment 2: fMRI
T2 visibility 49.73 (1, 25) < 0.001 0.41 (0.42) 0.32 0.50 0.75 (0.05) 0.65 0.85
Delay 1.55 (1, 25) 0.23
T2 visibility*delay 0.72 (2, 50) 0.49
T2 acc. 5–8 s 0.35 (0.05) 0.26 0.46 0.74 (0.05) 0.63 0.86
T2 acc. 9–11 s 0.47 (0.06) 0.34 0.60 0.76 (0.06) 0.64 0.88
T2 acc. 12–15 s 0.39 (0.06) 0.27 0.51 0.74 (0.05) 0.64 0.84
T2 delay (PAS = 1) 1.56 (2, 50) 0.23
T2 response times −2.64 (1, 25) 0.01 1193 (70) 1049 1337 1066 (43) 977 1155
Note: Significant values are in boldface. Cl = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit; T2 visibility = the main effect of visibility/PAS on T2 performance;
Delay = the main effect of delay time on T2 performance; T2 visibility*delay = the interaction effect between visibility and delay time on T2 performance; T2 acc. =
T2 performance after X s delay time; T2 delay (PAS = 1) = main effect of delay time on unseen T2 performance only; T2 response times = t-test comparison between
seen and unseen T2 response times (ms). T-values are reported for response time comparison, and F-values for all other comparisons.
notably in the left inferior temporal gyrus, parieto-occipital, and
frontal cortex (Figure 3A), but also in the right parietal cortex
and the left hippocampus. There was a similarly wide-spread, but
much less pronounced, pattern of BOLD signal change limited to
the left inferior temporal gyrus, superior parietal lobule, inferior
frontal gyrus, and precentral gyrus when comparing T2-unseen
with T2-absent trials.
When comparing the delay period of T2-seen with T2-
absent trials no significant BOLD signal change was found. The
comparison between the delay period of T2-unseen and T2-
absent trials revealed sustained BOLD signal change in the right
mid-lateral prefrontal cortex (mid-lateral PFC; crossing inferior
and middle frontal gyrus BA 45/46), right orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC), and bilateral cerebellum (crus II). Comparing the delay
period of T2-unseen with T2 seen trials revealed a cluster in the
mid-lateral PFC (t = −3.76) that overlapped with the cluster
found when comparing T2-unseen with T2-absent. To investi-
gate the relationship between BOLD signal change during the
delay period and task performance we correlated beta values
from the right mid-lateral PFC and OFC with unseen T2 per-
formance across participants. There was no significant relation
between regional BOLD signal change in mid-lateral PFC and
task performance (r(25) = −0.12, p = 0.58) or OFC and task
performance (r(25) =−0.07, p = 0.75).
When comparing the responses for T2-seen with T2-absent
trials BOLD signal change was found in the left inferior temporal
gyrus, postcentral gyrus, and superior parietal lobule (Figure 3C).
Comparing T2-unseen and T2-absent trial responses revealed no
significant BOLD signal change.
DISCUSSION
In contrast to common belief, we have shown that non-
consciously presented perceptual information can be durable,
here lasting with unaffected strength for at least 15 s. This result
replicate and extend previous findings of durable perceptual
representations by Hesselmann et al. (2011) of 4 s, and Soto
et al. (2011) of 5 s, and further challenge durability as a hallmark
for conscious experience. The sustained BOLD signal change
in mid-lateral PFC during maintenance of the non-consciously
perceived information is consistent with working memory. Our
findings are in line with Dutta et al. (2014) who found that BOLD
signal change in DLPFC over entire trials of masked information
predicted memory performance. Critically, however, our within-
trial separation of BOLD signal confirmed that sustained BOLD
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FIGURE 2 | The average BOLD signal change of T2-seen, T2-unseen,
and T2-absent trials compared to a low-level baseline (ITI) for (A)
stimulus presentation, (B) the delay period, and (C) the response
epochs.
signal change in the PFC occurs during maintenance of non-
conscious information.
Several different memory mechanisms, such as working mem-
ory, priming, or iconic memory, could in principle be responsible
for durable non-conscious representations. Although the cortical
aspects of iconic memory (fragile visual short-term memory)
can retain information for at least 4 s, it is easily overwrit-
ten by task-irrelevant distracters (Sligte et al., 2008). Similar
to Soto et al. (2011), the current AB paradigm used irrelevant
distracters after stimulus-presentation. This, combined with the
current delay of up to 15 s, makes iconic memory an unlikely
explanation.
Furthermore, the sustained BOLD signal change found in
right mid-lateral PFC, OFC, and cerebellum during the main-
tenance of non-consciously perceived information is inconsis-
tent with priming. The exact mechanisms of priming are still
unclear and may depend on task, material, and whether the
material is masked or not (Henson, 2003). However, priming
effects are likely either residual neural activity and/or latent neural
changes (e.g., long-term potentiation) that facilitates or inhibits
subsequent processing (Grill-Spector et al., 2006; Marsolek et al.,
2010). Neither residual neural activity nor latent neural changes
would elicit a sustained BOLD signal change over the entire delay
period.
Thus, only working memory remains as a possible explana-
tion for the durable non-conscious perceptual representations.
Although working memory is commonly seen as intimately linked
with conscious experience (Baars and Franklin, 2003; Dehaene
and Changeux, 2011; Baddeley, 2012), it has been suggested
on theoretical grounds that working memory indeed can oper-
ate non-consciously, as below-threshold activity (Fuster, 1995).
Other recent empirical studies also support the notion of non-
conscious working memory. Soto et al. (2011) have shown that
1–2 non-consciously presented items can be maintained during
a distractor-filled delay of up to 5 s. Dutta et al. (2014) linked
performance on a delayed task with non-consciously presented
information to BOLD signal change in the PFC. Furthermore,
they showed that transcranial direct current stimulation of the
PFC modulated performance, demonstrating that the PFC is
causally involved in such delayed performance. Pan et al. (2013)
demonstrated that when a non-consciously maintained item
matched an interocularly suppressed item, the latter had prior
entry into conscious awareness compared to non-matching items.
Critically, none of the results above can be explained by priming
mechanisms, because Soto et al. (2011) and Dutta et al. (2014)
used delayed cue-target orientation discrimination tasks where
cue and target never matched, and Pan et al. (2013) did several
control experiments to show that mere exposure to the masked
stimulus was not enough for prior entry, it had to be actively
maintained.
Neuroimaging studies of humans and single-unit recordings
in primates have revealed that working memory maintenance
is associated with sustained neural activity in lateral PFC and
posterior regions. Prefrontal cortex activity has been interpreted
as representing a preparatory action set, while posterior activ-
ity represents the memory content (Cabeza and Nyberg, 2000;
Curtis and D’Esposito, 2003; Fuster, 2009; Sreenivasan et al.,
2014). Consistent with our findings and non-conscious work-
ing memory, recent findings suggest that non-conscious infor-
mation can activate task sets (Reuss et al., 2011) and lead to
lateral prefrontal BOLD signal change (Lau and Passingham,
2007).
However, it is unclear why the sustained BOLD signal change
in the right PFC did not correlate with memory performance,
as might have been expected (Pessoa et al., 2002; Sakai et al.,
2002; Wager et al., 2014). Different lateral PFC regions have
been related to different executive functions during working
memory (Wager and Smith, 2003; Nee et al., 2013), and it is
conceivable that not all functions necessarily predicts perfor-
mance. Progressively rostral regions of the PFC seem to support
more abstract representations and more complex rules (Fuster,
2008; Badre and D’Esposito, 2009). The mid-lateral PFC sig-
nal change could therefore be related to task set maintenance
(Sakai and Passingham, 2003) or preparation for future action
(Pochon et al., 2001), while the OFC signal change might relate to
maintenance of more abstract representations (Nee and Brown,
2012) or executive control functions related to coordination and
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FIGURE 3 | All working memory epochs with T2-seen > T2-absent trials
in orange, T2-unseen > T2-absent trials in blue, and the overlap in
purple. The Y-axis: Beta values, X-axis: PAS = perceptual awareness scale,
bar colors correspond to the PAS classification of T2-seen and T2-unseen
trials, error bars: standard error of the mean. (A) Stimulus presentation
(IFG = inferior frontal gyrus, X = −46, Y = 28, Z = 24; SPL = superior parietal
lobule, X = −26, Y = −68, Z = 44; ITG = inferior temporal gyrus, X = −52,
Y = −54, Z = −18). (B) Delay period—displayed at p < 0.005 for illustrative
purposes (PFC = prefrontal cortex, X = 50, Y = 42, Z = 8; OFC = orbitofrontal
cortex, X = 20, Y = 58, Z = −22; Crus II in the cerebellum, X = −20,
Y = −74, Z = −38. (C) Response (PCG = postcentral gyrus, X = −42,
Y = −30, Z = 52; ITG = inferior temporal gyrus, X = −58, Y = −62, Z = −12).
simultaneous use of several cognitive processes such as mainte-
nance, manipulation, and monitoring (Owen et al., 2005; Barbey
et al., 2011).
The lateral prefrontal cortex has contralateral input and output
projections that form closed loops with crus I and II of the
cerebellum (Kelly and Strick, 2003; Bostan et al., 2013). Although
the exact function of the cerebellum in cognition is unclear, BOLD
signal change in crus I and II together with prefrontal cortex
have been associated with verbal working memory and executive
functions (Stoodley and Schmahmann, 2009).
The comparison of average signal change across conditions
with a low-level baseline revealed differences in the left infe-
rior frontal gyrus, and bilaterally in the occipital cortex during
maintenance. The signal change in inferior frontal gyrus is con-
sistent with neuroimaging findings related to sub-vocalization
during working memory maintenance (Paulesu et al., 1993),
which suggest that sub-vocalization was used to remember the
consciously perceived T1 and T2. It is unclear why there was no
significant BOLD signal change during the delay period when
comparing T2-seen and T2-absent trials. Possibly, the difference
between consciously maintaining 1 vs. 2 items (T1 vs. T1 + T2)
was not big enough to elicit detectable BOLD signal change.
The fact that there was a difference during delay between
T2-unseen and T2-absent trials therefore suggest that tempo-
rary maintenance of information can engage different processes
depending on if the information to be maintained is con-
scious or not. Although consciously perceived verbal informa-
tion is likely maintained by way of sub-vocalization, it seems
unlikely for non-consciously perceived verbal information to
be so. Instead, the non-consciously perceived verbal informa-
tion might be maintained as visual representations. Consciously
sub-vocalizing T1 while non-consciously maintaining T2 could
therefore act as a distraction or dual-task/process that leads to
increased PFC involvement (D’Esposito et al., 1995; Feredoes
et al., 2011). Different maintenance processes for conscious
and non-conscious representations would explain the stronger
BOLD signal change in the right mid-lateral PFC during main-
tenance of non-consciously compared to consciously perceived
information.
For T2-seen compared to T2-absent trials, BOLD signal
change was evident in the left inferior temporal gyrus dur-
ing stimulus presentation and response. This likely reflects
representational-level processing of T2, as previous neuroimaging
research has demonstrated signal change in inferior temporal
gyrus during single letter perception (Flowers et al., 2004; Park
et al., 2012). However, there was no significant BOLD signal
change in inferior temporal gyrus during the delay period follow-
ing consciously and non-consciously perceived information. Unit
recordings in primates have established that stimulus-specific
neurons in sensory regions are temporarily activated during
working memory retention (Fuster and Jervey, 1981; Miyashita
and Chang, 1988; Miller and Desimone, 1994), but human neu-
roimaging findings have not been as consistent. Several working-
memory studies with letter-tasks did not reveal inferior temporal
gyrus involvement during maintenance and manipulation of let-
ters (Cabeza and Nyberg, 2000). Although the signal change in
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stimulus-specific sensory regions fail to reach the same elevated
level as frontal regions during maintenance, it has recently been
shown that multivariate pattern analysis can detect stimulus-
specific information (Riggall and Postle, 2012). It could therefore
be the case that simply maintaining one item in working memory
is generally not enough to elicit elevated levels of BOLD signal in
stimulus-specific sensory regions.
Consistent with the GNW model and previous findings a
comparison between T2-seen and T2-absent trials revealed large
and wide-spread BOLD signal change in the left inferior temporal
gyrus (Flowers et al., 2004; Park et al., 2012), and PPN (Rees
et al., 2002; Naghavi and Nyberg, 2005; Dehaene and Changeux,
2011) during the stimulus presentation. Corresponding BOLD
signal change was also found in inferior temporal gyrus during
the comparison between T2-unseen and T2-absent trials, which
is consistent with previous studies on non-conscious perception
(Rees et al., 2002; Marois et al., 2004; Heinzel et al., 2008; Dehaene
and Changeux, 2011). However, the wide-spread PPN involve-
ment in T2-unseen compared to T2-absent trials during stimulus
presentation is inconsistent with the GNW model. Although
previous masking studies have found that non-conscious pro-
cessing tends to be limited (but not exclusive) to posterior sen-
sory regions (Dehaene et al., 1994, 2001; Kouider et al., 2007),
more recent studies have implicated the PPN (Kranczioch et al.,
2005; Diaz and McCarthy, 2007) and prefrontal cortex (Lau
and Passingham, 2007; Wokke et al., 2011) in non-conscious
processing. It is conceivable that our wide-spread BOLD signal
change was the result of relatively long stimulus presentation
durations (M = 129 ms, during fMRI) compared to the 17–50 ms
commonly used in masking paradigms. Furthermore, that non-
consciously presented information not only can activate, but also
maintain durable representations in higher-order regions, such as
the mid-lateral PFC and the OFC, for 15 s is inconsistent with
the GNW model’s predictions that extended PFC activity and
durable maintenance is unique to conscious processing (Dehaene
and Changeux, 2011).
An alternative model (to GNW) of conscious experience
predicts that neural processes are accompanied by conscious
experience if (and only if) the neural activity reaches a certain
undefined threshold. Such amplitude models (Fuster, 1995; Zeki,
2001) predict that conscious experience should correlate with
higher amplitudes, and has no a priori reason to assume that
higher-order regions, wide-spread cortical interactions, or higher-
level cognitive functions such as working memory should be
uniquely reserved for conscious experiences. Instead, amplitude
models predict that non-conscious functions, and their under-
lying neural activity would be similar but weaker, which is what
neuroimaging findings seem to indicate (Rees et al., 2002; Lau
and Passingham, 2006; Diaz and McCarthy, 2007; Wokke et al.,
2011).
Comparing T2-seen with T2-absent trials during the response
revealed BOLD signal change in the left inferior temporal gyrus,
postcentral gyrus, and superior parietal lobule. The inferior tem-
poral gyrus signal change is consistent with previous research,
where signal change usually involves a transient peak in both
prefrontal and posterior regions during stimulus presentation and
response epochs, and a lower, sustained BOLD signal change
during the maintenance epoch (Druzgal and D’Esposito, 2003).
The contrast between T2-unseen and T2-absent trials did not
reveal a significant BOLD signal difference. Interestingly, the
nominal BOLD signal change in inferior temporal gyrus during
response was comparable to the (significant) signal change during
stimulus presentation (Figure 3). Thus, it seems that the inferior
temporal gyrus signal change was non-significant due to higher
variability rather than amplitude, which is in line with recent
proposals of (low) variability as a hallmark of conscious processes
(Schurger et al., 2010).
There are several valid approaches to measure and opera-
tionally define conscious experience and the lack thereof. We
have here used a subjective measure of awareness. Compared
with objective measures, subjective measures are more liberal
and risk overestimating the extent of non-conscious process-
ing. However, the more conservative objective measures may
instead underestimate the effect of non-conscious processing
by (miss) attributing them as conscious (Merikle et al., 2001).
Possibly, using conservative measures of conscious experience
may have biased previous findings that show non-conscious
processes to be short-lived. The particular measure used here
(“The Perceptual Awareness Scale”) has been shown superior to
other subjective measures such as confidence ratings (Cheesman
and Merikle, 1986) and post-decision wagering (Persaud et al.,
2007) in terms of sensitivity and exhaustiveness (Sandberg et al.,
2010).
The use of a four-alternative forced-choice task with fixed
response options opens up the possibility that the participants
decided how to respond during the delay instead of when
prompted. This is, however, not consistent with the response-time
data. If participants already decided what letter to guess before
prompted, then the response times for unseen T2s should be
the same as for seen T2s, because in both cases the participants
would know their prospective response in advance. Instead, if the
participants decided what to guess when prompted, the unseen
trials should have a slower response time than seen trials to
account for extra deliberation time, which was the case. Indeed,
there was no significant difference in response time between T2-
unseen and T2-absent trials. Furthermore, the sustained BOLD
signal change found when comparing the T2-unseen and T2-
absent trials cannot be explained by such behavior. Given that
the lack of perceptual awareness of T2 was identical for both
conditions, the (deliberate) strategy must have been identical as
well.
In sum, we have demonstrated that non-conscious percep-
tual representations can last for up to 15 s despite irrelevant
distracters, and argue that this effect is best explained in terms
of (non-conscious) working-memory mechanisms. Most notably,
we found sustained BOLD signal change in the right mid-lateral
PFC and OFC during the delay period. In addition, we found
widespread frontal and parieto-temporal BOLD signal change
during non-conscious perception. Although it is too early to say
whether these durable non-conscious representations can truly be
understood as working memory processes and not some other
form of non-conscious memory, the current findings combined
with recent similar research are compelling (Soto and Silvanto,
2014). Important next steps will be to convincingly show that
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a stimulus-specific representation is actively maintained during
the delay-period (e.g., by using multivariate pattern classification
algorithms), to compare potential functional differences between
conscious and non-conscious working-memory operations (e.g.,
in terms of capacity and/or fidelity), and to determine how con-
scious and non-conscious working memory operations interact.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The project was supported by grants from the medical faculty
and the collecting foundation for medical research at Umeå
University, and a grant from the Swedish Research Council, to
Johan Eriksson. The project was also supported by grants from
the Torsten and Ragnar Söderberg foundation and the Knut
and Alice Wallenberg foundation to Lars Nyberg. We thank Lars
Nyberg and Greger Orädd for comments on the manuscript,
Anders Lundquist for statistical advice, and Micael Andersson for
technical assistance.
REFERENCES
Ashburner, J. (2007). A fast diffeomorphic image registration algorithm. Neuroim-
age 38, 95–113. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2007.07.007
Baars, B. J., and Franklin, S. (2003). How conscious experience and working
memory interact. Trends Cogn. Sci. 7, 166–172. doi: 10.1016/s1364-6613(03)
00056-1
Baddeley, A. (2012). Working memory: theories, models and controversies. Annu.
Rev. Psychol. 63, 1–29. doi: 10.1146/annurev-psych-120710-100422
Badre, D., and D’Esposito, M. (2009). Is the rostro-caudal axis of the frontal lobe
hierarchical?. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 10, 659–669. doi: 10.1038/nrn2667
Barbey, A. K., Koenigs, M., and Grafman, J. (2011). Orbitofrontal contri-
butions to human working memory. Cereb. Cortex 21, 789–795. doi: 10.
1093/cercor/bhq153
Behzadi, Y., Restom, K., Liau, J., and Liu, T. T. (2007). A component based
noise correction method (CompCor) for BOLD and perfusion based fMRI.
Neuroimage 37, 90–101. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2007.04.042
Bostan, A. C., Dum, R. P., and Strick, P. L. (2013). Cerebellar networks with the
cerebral cortex and basal ganglia. Trends Cogn. Sci. 17, 241–254. doi: 10.1016/j.
tics.2013.03.003
Cabeza, R., and Nyberg, L. (2000). Imaging cognition II: an empirical review
of 275 PET and fMRI studies. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 12, 1–47. doi: 10.
1162/08989290051137585
Cheesman, J., and Merikle, P. M. (1986). Distinguishing conscious from uncon-
scious perceptual processes. Can. J. Psychol. 40, 343–367. doi: 10.1037/h0080103
Curtis, C. E., and D’Esposito, M. (2003). Persistent activity in the prefrontal cortex
during working memory. Trends Cogn. Sci. 7, 415–423. doi: 10.1016/s1364-
6613(03)00197-9
D’Esposito, M., Detre, J., Alsop, D. C., Shin, R. K., Atlas, S., and Grossman, M.
(1995). The neural basis of the central executive system of working memory.
Nature 378, 279–281. doi: 10.1038/378279a0
Dehaene, S., and Changeux, J.-P. (2011). Experimental and theoretical approaches
to conscious processing. Neuron 70, 200–227. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2011.03.018
Dehaene, S., Charles, L., King, J.-R., and Marti, S. (2014). Toward a computational
theory of conscious processing. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 25, 76–84. doi: 10.1016/j.
conb.2013.12.005
Dehaene, S., Naccache, L., Clec’H, G., Koechlin, E., Dehaene-Lambertz, G.,
Moortele, P.-F., et al. (1994). Semantic priming in a single-word shadowing task.
Am. J. Psychol. 107, 245–260. doi: 10.2307/1423039
Dehaene, S., Naccache, L., Cohen, L., Bihan, D. L., Mangin, J. F., Poline, J. B.,
et al. (2001). Cerebral mechanisms of word masking and unconscious repetition
priming. Nat. Neurosci. 4, 752–758. doi: 10.1038/89551
Diaz, M. T., and McCarthy, G. (2007). Unconscious word processing engages a
distributed network of brain regions. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 19, 1768–1775. doi: 10.
1162/jocn.2007.19.11.1768
Druzgal, T. J., and D’Esposito, M. (2003). Dissecting contributions of prefrontal
cortex and fusiform face area to face working memory. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 15,
771–784. doi: 10.1162/089892903322370708
Dutta, A., Shah, K., Silvanto, J., and Soto, D. (2014). Neural basis of non-conscious
visual working memory. Neuroimage 91C, 336–343. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.
2014.01.016
Feredoes, E., Heinen, K., Weiskopf, N., Ruff, C., and Driver, J. (2011). Causal
evidence for frontal involvement in memory target maintenance by posterior
brain areas during distracter interference of visual working memory. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. U S A 108, 17510–17515. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1106439108
Flowers, D. L., Jones, K., Noble, K., VanMeter, J., Zeffiro, T. A., Wood, F. B., et al.
(2004). Attention to single letters activates left extrastriate cortex. Neuroimage
21, 829–839. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2003.10.002
Fuster, J. M. (1995). Memory in the Cerebral Cortex—An Empirical Approach to
Neural Networks in the Human and Nonhuman Primate. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Fuster, J. M. (2008). The Prefrontal Cortex. 4th Edn. London: Academic Press.
Fuster, J. M. (2009). Cortex and memory: emergence of a new paradigm. J. Cogn.
Neurosci. 21, 2047–2072. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2009.21280
Fuster, J. M., and Jervey, J. P. (1981). Inferotemporal neurons distinguish and retain
behaviorally relevant features of visual stimuli. Science 212, 952–955. doi: 10.
1126/science.7233192
Greenwald, A. G., Draine, S. C., and Abrams, R. L. (1996). Three cognitive
markers of unconscious semantic activation. Science 273, 1699–1702. doi: 10.
1126/science.273.5282.1699
Grill-Spector, K., Henson, R., and Martin, A. (2006). Repetition and the brain:
neural models of stimulus-specific effects. Trends Cogn. Sci. 10, 14–23. doi: 10.
1016/j.tics.2005.11.006
Heinzel, A., Hautzel, H., Poeppel, T. D., Boers, F., Beu, M., and Mueller, H.-W.
(2008). Neural correlates of subliminal and supraliminal letter processing–an
event-related fMRI study. Conscious. Cogn. 17, 685–699. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.
2008.01.008
Henson, R. N. (2003). Neuroimaging studies of priming. Prog. Neurobiol. 70, 53–81.
doi: 10.1016/s0301-0082(03)00086-8
Hesselmann, G., Hebart, M., and Malach, R. (2011). Differential BOLD activity
associated with subjective and objective reports during “blindsight” in normal
observers. J. Neurosci. 31, 12936–12944. doi: 10.1523/jneurosci.1556-11.2011
Kelly, R. M., and Strick, P. L. (2003). Cerebellar loops with motor cortex and
prefrontal cortex of a nonhuman primate. J. Neurosci. 23, 8432–8444.
Koch, C., and Crick, F. (2001). The zombie within. Nature 411:893. doi: 10.
1038/35082161
Kouider, S., and Dehaene, S. (2007). Levels of processing during non-conscious
perception: a critical review of visual masking. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol.
Sci. 362, 857–875. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2007.2093
Kouider, S., Dehaene, S., Jobert, A., and Le Bihan, D. (2007). Cerebral bases of
subliminal and supraliminal priming during reading. Cereb. Cortex 17, 2019–
2029. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhl110
Kranczioch, C., Debener, S., Schwarzbach, J., Goebel, R., and Engel, A. K. (2005).
Neural correlates of conscious perception in the attentional blink. Neuroimage
24, 704–714. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2004.09.024
Lau, H. C., and Passingham, R. E. (2006). Relative blindsight in normal observers
and the neural correlate of visual consciousness. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U S A 103,
18763–18768. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0607716103
Lau, H. C., and Passingham, R. E. (2007). Unconscious activation of the cognitive
control system in the human prefrontal cortex. J. Neurosci. 27, 5805–5811.
doi: 10.1523/jneurosci.4335-06.2007
Logan, G. D., and Crump, M. J. C. (2010). Cognitive illusions of authorship reveal
hierarchical error detection in skilled typists. Science 330, 683–686. doi: 10.
1126/science.1190483
Luck, S., Vogel, E., and Shapiro, K. (1996). Word meanings can be accessed
but not reported during the attentional blink. Nature 383, 616–618. doi: 10.
1038/383616a0
Marois, R., Yi, D.-J., and Chun, M. M. (2004). The neural fate of consciously
perceived and missed events in the attentional blink. Neuron 41, 465–472.
doi: 10.1016/s0896-6273(04)00012-1
Marsolek, C. J., Deason, R. G., Ketz, N. A., Ramanathan, P., Bernat, E. M., Steele,
V. R., et al. (2010). Identifying objects impairs knowledge of other objects: a
relearning explanation for the neural repetition effect. Neuroimage 49, 1919–
1932. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.08.063
Martens, S., and Wyble, B. (2010). The attentional blink: past, present and future
of a blind spot in perceptual awareness. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 34, 947–957.
doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2009.12.005
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org November 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 938 | 9
Bergström and Eriksson Non-conscious maintenance engages prefrontal cortex
Merikle, P. M., Smilek, D., and Eastwood, J. D. (2001). Perception without aware-
ness: perspectives from cognitive psychology. Cognition 79, 115–134. doi: 10.
1016/s0010-0277(00)00126-8
Miller, E. K., and Desimone, R. (1994). Parallel neuronal mechanisms for short-
term memory. Science 263, 520–522. doi: 10.1126/science.8290960
Miyashita, Y., and Chang, H. S. (1988). Neuronal correlate of pictorial short-
term memory in the primate temporal cortex. Nature 331, 68–70. doi: 10.
1038/331068a0
Naghavi, H. R., and Nyberg, L. (2005). Common fronto-parietal activity in atten-
tion, memory and consciousness: shared demands on integration? Conscious.
Cogn. 14, 390–425. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2004.10.003
Nee, D. E., and Brown, J. W. (2012). Rostral-caudal gradients of abstraction revealed
by multi-variate pattern analysis of working memory. Neuroimage 63, 1285–
1294. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.08.034
Nee, D. E., Brown, J. W., Askren, M. K., Berman, M. G., Demiralp, E., Krawitz,
A., et al. (2013). A meta-analysis of executive components of working memory.
Cereb. Cortex 23, 264–282. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhs007
Overgaard, M., Rote, J., Mouridsen, K., and Ramsøy, T. Z. (2006). Is conscious
perception gradual or dichotomous? A comparison of report methodologies
during a visual task. Conscious. Cogn. 15, 700–708. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2006.
04.002
Owen, A. M., McMillan, K. M., Laird, A. R., and Bullmore, E. (2005). N-back work-
ing memory paradigm: a meta-analysis of normative functional neuroimaging
studies. Hum. Brain Mapp. 25, 46–59. doi: 10.1002/hbm.20131
Pan, Y., Lin, B., Zhao, Y., and Soto, D. (2013). Working memory biasing of
visual perception without awareness. Atten. Percept. Psychophys. 76, 2051–2062.
doi: 10.3758/s13414-013-0566-2
Park, J., Hebrank, A., Polk, T. A., and Park, D. C. (2012). Neural dissociation
of number from letter recognition and its relationship to parietal numerical
processing. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 24, 39–50. doi: 10.1162/jocn_a_00085
Paulesu, E., Frith, C. D., and Frackowiak, R. S. (1993). The neural correlates
of the verbal component of working memory. Nature 362, 342–345. doi: 10.
1038/362342a0
Persaud, N., McLeod, P., and Cowey, A. (2007). Post-decision wagering objectively
measures awareness. Nat. Neurosci. 10, 257–261. doi: 10.1038/nn1840
Pessiglione, M., Schmidt, L., Draganski, B., Kalisch, R., Lau, H., Dolan, R. J., et al.
(2007). How the brain translates money into force: a neuroimaging study of
subliminal motivation. Science 316, 904–906. doi: 10.1126/science.1140459
Pessoa, L., Gutierrez, E., Bandettini, P., and Ungerleider, L. (2002). Neural correlates
of visual working memory: fMRI amplitude predicts task performance. Neuron
35, 975–987. doi: 10.1016/S0896-6273(02)00817-6
Pochon, J. B., Levy, R., Poline, J. B., Crozier, S., Lehéricy, S., Pillon, B., et al. (2001).
The role of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in the preparation of forthcoming
actions: an fMRI study. Cereb. Cortex 11, 260–266. doi: 10.1093/cercor/11.
3.260
Raymond, J., Shapiro, K., and Arnell, K. (1992). Temporary suppression of visual
processing in an RSVP task: an attentional blink? J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept.
Perform. 18, 849–860. doi: 10.1037//0096-1523.18.3.849
Rees, G., Kreiman, G., and Koch, C. (2002). Neural correlates of consciousness in
humans. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 3, 261–270. doi: 10.1038/nrn783
Reuss, H., Kiesel, A., Kunde, W., and Hommel, B. (2011). Unconscious activa-
tion of task sets. Conscious. Cogn. 20, 556–567. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.
02.014
Riggall, A. C., and Postle, B. R. (2012). The relationship between working memory
storage and elevated activity as measured with functional magnetic resonance
imaging. J. Neurosci. 32, 12990–12998. doi: 10.1523/jneurosci.1892-12.2012
Sakai, K., and Passingham, R. E. (2003). Prefrontal interactions reflect future task
operations. Nat. Neurosci. 6, 75–81. doi: 10.1038/nn987
Sakai, K., Rowe, J. B., and Passingham, R. E. (2002). Active maintenance in
prefrontal area 46 creates distractor-resistant memory. Nat. Neurosci. 5, 479–
484. doi: 10.1038/nn846
Sandberg, K., Timmermans, B., Overgaard, M., and Cleeremans, A. (2010). Mea-
suring consciousness: is one measure better than the other? Conscious. Cogn. 19,
1069–1078. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2009.12.013
Schurger, A., Pereira, F., Treisman, A., and Cohen, J. D. (2010). Reproducibility
distinguishes conscious from nonconscious neural representations. Science 327,
97–99. doi: 10.1126/science.1180029
Sergent, C., Baillet, S., and Dehaene, S. (2005). Timing of the brain events underly-
ing access to consciousness during the attentional blink. Nat. Neurosci. 8, 1391–
1400. doi: 10.1038/nn1549
Sligte, I. G., Scholte, H. S., and Lamme, V. A. F. (2008). Are there multiple
visual short-term memory stores? PLoS One 3:e1699. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.
0001699
Soto, D., Mäntylä, T., and Silvanto, J. (2011). Working memory without conscious-
ness. Curr. Biol. 21, R912–R913. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2011.09.049
Soto, D., and Silvanto, J. (2014). Reappraising the relationship between working
memory and conscious awareness. Trends Cogn. Sci. 18, 520–525. doi: 10.1016/
j.tics.2014.06.005
Sreenivasan, K. K., Curtis, C. E., and D’Esposito, M. (2014). Revisiting the role of
persistent neural activity during working memory. Trends Cogn. Sci. 18, 82–89.
doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2013.12.001
Stoodley, C. J., and Schmahmann, J. D. (2009). Functional topography in the
human cerebellum: a meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies. Neuroimage 44,
489–501. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2008.08.039
Wager, T. D., and Smith, E. E. (2003). Neuroimaging studies of working memory:
a meta-analysis. Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 3, 255–274. doi: 10.3758/cabn.3.
4.255
Wager, T. D., Spicer, J., Insler, R., and Smith, E. E. (2014). The neural bases of
distracter-resistant working memory. Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 14, 90–105.
doi: 10.3758/s13415-013-0226-y
Wokke, M. E., van Gaal, S., Scholte, H. S., Ridderinkhof, K. R., and Lamme, V. A. F.
(2011). The flexible nature of unconscious cognition. PLoS One 6:e25729.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0025729
Zeki, S. (2001). Localization and globalization in conscious vision. Annu. Rev.
Neurosci. 24, 57–86. doi: 10.1146/annurev.neuro.24.1.57
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was conducted
in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed
as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 13 August 2014; paper pending published: 18 October 2014; accepted: 04
November 2014; published online: 21 November 2014.
Citation: Bergström F and Eriksson J (2014) Maintenance of non-consciously pre-
sented information engages the prefrontal cortex. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:938.
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00938
This article was submitted to the journal Frontiers in Human Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2014 Bergström and Eriksson. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution and reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal
is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org November 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 938 | 10
